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SUBJECT: THE NEW JOINT CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR IRAQ

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY:

¶1. (S/REL MCFI) Ambassador Crocker and MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus have agreed upon a new Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) for Operation Iraq Freedom. It says that the Coalition, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, will employ an integrated set of actions to help Iraq achieve sustainable security and advance political reconciliation and economic development by the summer of 2009.

¶2. (S/REL MCFI) The JCP has four Lines of Operation (LOO): Political, Security, Economic, and Diplomatic. Primacy is given to the Political LOO. The JCP also has activities that cut across all four LOOs. These include rule of law, engagement with reconcilable armed groups, transitioning responsibilities to the Iraqis, and strategic communications (public diplomacy and public affairs).

¶3. (S/REL MCFI) The goals between now and the summer of 2009 are divided into two phases.

-- In the near term (6 to 12 months), political reconciliation is advanced at the local level, in part by bringing reconcilable armed groups into the political process; localized violence is reduced and irreconcilable armed groups rendered less effective; malign external influences, particularly from Iran and Syria, are abated; and the framework for economic development is improved. (The JCP posits that achieving the near-term goals should allow for a gradual reduction in Coalition forces.)

-- In the intermediate term (12 to 24 months), reconciliation is further advanced; sustainable security is established nationwide; increased regional and international support for Iraq is secured; and the conditions for sustainable economic development are established. (The JCP posits that achieving the intermediate-term goals should allow for further reductions in Coalition forces.) END SUMMARY.

HOW THE NEW JCP DIFFERS FROM THE PREVIOUS PLAN

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¶5. (S/REL MCFI) Key aspects in which this JCP differs from the previous plan (April 2006) include the following:  
-- The new JCP gives top priority to political accommodation.  
-- The new JCP places primary security emphasis on protecting the population. The previous emphasis was on the transition of security responsibilities to the GOI.  
-- The new JCP unlike the previous plan recognizes the importance of the neighboring states. It notes that Iran and Syria can disrupt Coalition efforts in Iraq and will probably continue to do so without incentives to change their behavior.  
-- The new JCP reduces expectations within the specified timeframe. The previous JCP envisioned that by early 2007 Baghdad and nine key cities would be secured, AQI defeated, and the conditions set for the transfer of internal security

responsibilities to Iraqi police authorities, and that by early 2008 the insurgency would be fully neutralized.  
-- The new JCP looks to beyond 2009, whereas the previous JCP looked to the end of 2009, to achieve the President's goals of an Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order, to defend Iraq's territorial integrity and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.

THE POLITICAL LINE OF OPERATION: THE NEAR TERM  
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¶6. (S/REL MCFI) The Political LOO aims to move Iraqi factions, both inside and outside the GOI, towards political accommodation while marginalizing destabilizing actors.

¶7. (S/REL MCFI) In the near term, this will require key leaders reaching a compromise that facilitates power sharing, thereby promoting a national political accommodation. Such a compromise will in turn be facilitated by fulfilling the following conditions:

- Improved technical and less sectarian behavior by the GOI, including visible progress in prosecuting government and security officials who break the law, broadening the decision-making of the GOI by more empowerment of the Council of Representatives and Presidency Council, and more efficient and less sectarian service delivery.
- The enactment of legislation and other measures that promote national reconciliation, including a hydrocarbons law, a revenue management law, a provincial elections law, a provincial powers law, the narrowing of differences over constitutional amendments, and addressing de-baathification concerns.
- Increased confidence and engagement of Sunni Arabs in the

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government, thus reducing Sunni support for violence, and making it easier to induce reconcilable Sunni insurgent groups at the local level to conclude cease-fires and enter the political process and to help counter al-Qaida.  
-- Reduced support for violence in the Shia community, especially among Shia in government, thus making it easier through a combination of kinetic operations and dialogue to induce some Shia militias at the local level to conclude cease-fires and enter the political process.  
-- The empowerment of Sunni and Shia moderates by speedier processing of Coalition and Iraqi detainees and selective releases of detainees.  
-- A positive political role by the Kurds that includes promoting compromise between the Sunnis and the Shia, and refraining from actions that provoke violence in north Iraq, in part by agreeing to a delay in the Article 140 referendum.

THE POLITICAL LINE OF OPERATION: THE INTERMEDIATE TERM  
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¶8. (S/REL MCFI) The Political LOO in the intermediate term consists of an extension of the measures begun in the near term that are aimed at promoting national reconciliation. Intermediate-term measures include:

- Agreement on distributing power among national, regional, and local authorities, marked by ratification of a constitutional referendum by a cross-sectarian majority, and implementation of broadly-backed provincial and regional power laws.
- Continued improved performance of the Iraqi government, marked by more efficient and less sectarian service delivery, vigorous prosecution of government and security officials who break the law, and broad public confidence in the ISF.
- Continued entry into the political process of reconcilable Shia and Sunni armed groups, marked by negotiated cease-fires, opposition by the groups to al-Qaida, progress in demobilization disarmament and reintegration, and passage of an amnesty law.
- Peaceful resolution of the status of Article 140-related border disputes, including the city of Kirkuk, with the support of the neighboring states and the broader

international community.

THE SECURITY LINE OF OPERATION: THE NEAR TERM

¶9. (S/REL MCFI) The Security LOO recognizes that enduring success will not be achieved by military victory and that security operations must be in support of the Political LOO, which aims above all to promote political reconciliation.

¶10. (S/REL MCFI) Security operations in the near term focus on three concurrent efforts:

- Protecting the population by reducing sectarian violence, making progress towards neutralizing the insurgency and al-Qaida in Iraq, and reducing malign external security threats.
- Using military action to leverage political progress by putting military pressure on reconcilable hold-outs, concluding local cease-fires with reconcilable groups and enlisting their help in countering al-Qaida, and offering to protect members of previously irreconcilable groups who come to terms.
- Reforming the security sector by reversing trends toward sectarian behavior and empowering non-sectarian leaders, removing in accordance with the law officials who break the law, expanding and improving the capacities of the army and police, enhancing Coalition transition teams (which mentor and advise), increasing the capacity to process and hold prisoners and detainees, and finalizing the national security architecture.

THE SECURITY LINE OF OPERATION: THE INTERMEDIATE TERM

¶11. (S/REL MCFI) The Security LOO for the intermediate term continues the focus on protecting the population, using military action to leverage political process, and reforming the security sector. Successful implementation of the LOO would fulfill the conditions for a further drawdown of Coalition forces and for transitioning security responsibilities to the Iraqis.

¶12. (S/REL MCFI) In the intermediate-term:

- Security is established nationwide, as the Iraqi army and police take the lead in further neutralizing irreconcilable elements, and malign external influences are further reduced.
- Most reconcilable elements embrace the political process, as preferable to violence (this is in contradiction with nationwide ceasefire established with reconcilable elements).
- Expanded non-sectarian army and police forces assume significant responsibilities in protecting the populace, as further progress is made in removing or prosecuting in

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accordance with the law malign officials, expanded Coalition Transition Teams are in place for a long-term mission, and prison and detainee facilities are able to sustain streamlined legal detainee operations free from sectarian bias.

THE DIPLOMATIC LINE OF OPERATION: THE NEAR TERM

¶13. (S/REL MCFI) Within the Diplomatic LOO, the Coalition engages regional actors and the broader international community to reduce malign external influences and to obtain support for Iraq. The Diplomatic LOO takes as a given that Iran and Syria are the countries with the most influence with malign forces inside Iraq, that it is possible to drive a wedge between Iran and Syria, and that Iran has the greatest capacity both to block and to facilitate progress on all our LOOs.

¶14. (S/REL MCFI) Near-term diplomatic activities seek to:

- Reduce destabilizing external influences in order to reduce the flow of weapons and foreign fighters into Iraq, and to persuade Turkey to refrain from major cross-border operations against the PKK. Among the means to accomplish this will be U.S. dialogue with Iran and Syria. The GOI will

also need to act on its own behalf to end destabilizing activities and to normalize relations with Iran and Syria.

- Secure the necessary international authorities through ¶2008. This includes a follow-on UNSCR authorizing Coalition operations before UNSCR 1723 expires in December 2007, and a renewed and expanded mandate of UNAMI before its expiration in August 2007.
- Secure more international support for Iraq. This will include the UN taking a leading role in the eventual Article 140 process, Coalition members sustaining their engagement and taking on training or reconstruction in the absence of a combat role.
- Secure increasing regional acceptance. This will include the positive participation of Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait in the three Neighbors Working Groups (Borders/Security, Refugees, Energy/Fuel); debt forgiveness on Paris Club terms by Egypt and Saudi Arabia; and the opening of embassies by Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the ambassadorial level.

THE DIPLOMATIC LINE OF OPERATION: THE INTERMEDIATE TERM

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¶15. (S/REL MCFI) The Diplomatic LOO envisions that U.S. and Iraqi engagement with regional states and the broader international community begun in the near term will continue and that in the intermediate term:

- Positive engagement with neighbors is underway, with Iran abandoning its support of destabilizing elements in Iraq, Syria acting to stop the flow of foreign fighters and weapons into Iraq and publicly recognizing the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, Turkey refraining from major cross-border operations and supporting a UN-mediated process to determine Kirkuk's final status, and Kuwait and Iraq agreeing to replace the UN Compensation Commission with a bilateral arrangement.
- Post-UNSCR security arrangements for 2009 are in place, with the U.S. and Iraq agreeing on authorities that allow for an effective U.S. military presence on the ground.
- The international community increases its engagement in Iraq, with the UN taking a lead role in provincial and local elections, Iraq joining the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative before the NATO summit in 2008, the WTO Working Party on Iraq holding a successful second meeting, and the Neighbors Working Group on Energy and Fuel holding talks on the feasibility of restarting Iraqi natural gas exports to Kuwait.

ECONOMIC LINE OF OPERATION: THE NEAR AND INTERMEDIATE TERMS

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¶16. (S/REL MCFI) The Economic LOO seeks to promote an open, diversified and expanding economy led by private sector growth and integrated into the international economic system. Although only a limited improvement in the economy can be expected without an improvement in the security situation, the Economic LOO identifies measures that could support political accommodation and sustainable security.

¶17. (S/REL MCFI) The Economic LOO places top priority on helping the GOI accelerate budget execution, so that the GOI can gain credibility with the population by consistently delivering goods and services. In the near term, this includes formulating and operationalizing ministerial engagement teams for key ministries to speed up budget execution and to identify and eliminate spending bottlenecks, such as Letters of Credit and cash allocation. Securing 607 authority also is emphasized to help the GoI expend its

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capital budget by expediting project implementation in crucial areas. In the intermediate term, capacity development actions are stressed to enable the GoI to deliver all core services sustainably. Capacity development actions are focused on improving institutional systems, processes; and human skills instead of large scale physical improvements within Iraq.

¶18. (S/REL MCFI) Other priorities of the Economic LOO are to:

-- Expedite energy sector development. In the near term, this includes passing the hydrocarbons and revenue management laws, reducing supply bottlenecks, and providing enhanced Coalition security support for energy infrastructure. In the intermediate term, this includes enacting implementing regulations for the hydrocarbon law, putting fuel meters on all depots and major arteries, and improving GOI infrastructure protection services.

-- Create sustainable employment. In the near term, this includes short-term measures for job creation until security improves and the private sector increases, funding agribusiness programs, supporting vocational training, expanding microfinance and SME lending, and improving security for commercial zones in Baghdad. (Note: short term job creation programs have also been developed to follow kinetic activities, and their primary goals are security-related rather than economic. End note.) In the intermediate term, this includes furthering private business development, improving Iraqi access to the international markets and transforming some commercial zones in Baghdad into enterprise zones.

-- Reform subsidy programs. In the near term, this includes continuing fuel subsidy reductions to normalize fuel prices in accordance with IMF recommendations, accelerating construction of storage facilities to support private-sector fuel importation, and implementing a new social safety net. In the intermediate term, this includes gradually increasing electricity prices and implementing a reformed pension plan.

-- Improve banking reform and monetary policy. In the near term, this includes implementing an Iraqi-led system to make cash transactions safer, and providing advice on containing inflation and maintaining a stable dinar. In the intermediate term, this includes working with the GOI and IMF to ensure that banking reform and monetary policy remain on track.

-- Foster transparency and fight corruption in economic-related ministries. In the near term, this includes strengthening officials auditing systems, urging GoI officials to comply with financial disclosure regulations and arrest warrants, and pressing the GoI to cease sectarian appointments and politically motivated prosecutions. In the intermediate term, this includes helping the GOI establish an anti-corruption institute and reducing the Coalition role and increasing the Iraqi role in investigations.

-- Increase the regional and international integration of Iraq (see also the Diplomatic LOO). In the near term, this includes helping the GOI continue to implement reforms called for by the Standby Arrangement with the IMF, helping implement the International Compact with Iraq, aiding in discussions for WTO membership, and ensuring that Iraq has key international routes and infrastructure. In the intermediate term, this includes helping the GOI pass laws and implement agreements that facilitate participation in international treaties and organizations.

#### CROSS-CUTTING LINES OF ACTIVITY

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¶19. (S/REL MCFI) The JCP also has lines of activity that cut across the four LOOs and help enable all of them. These include rule of law, engagement with reconcilable armed groups, transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi control, and strategic communications (public diplomacy and public affairs). The JCP addresses each of these in separate annexes.

#### SUBORDINATE PLANS

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¶20. (S/REL MCFI) The JCP provides a broad strategic framework for the efforts of the U.S. Mission and MNF-I. Translation of this strategic framework into specific actions will require additional implementing guidance. Such products will include plans and orders developed by MNF-I, as well as the US Mission's Joint Economic Action Plan and a Democracy Development Strategy.

#### CONSTRAINTS AND REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS

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¶21. (S/REL MCFI) The new JCP is influenced by perceived time constraints driven by domestic U.S. politics and public opinion, and states the time available to show results is running out. The new JCP sets focused and ambitious

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short-term goals for the next two years, given the challenges facing Iraq and the time historically needed for reconciliation after a war. It is a game plan for two minutes left on the clock, not for the start of the second quarter.

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